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Abstract 
How should the environmental policy corresponding to the use of wealth and goods harmful to the environment under 
the circumstances of complete information and asymmetric information be formulated? This is the topic of discussion 
for this article. The main conclusions are: 1) Higher social emphasis on environmental pollution will lead to reduced 
consumption level of pollution goods. 2) With the implementation of tax policy, the government is able to reduce the 
quantity of pollution goods, increase the consumption level of more environmentally friendly goods, bring the society 
closer to optimal level, and enhance social welfare level. 3) The optimal rate of the subsidy (taxation) for the more 
environmentally friendly goods is t2=t1-Δθ.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology. 
Keyword: complete information, asymmetric information,principal-agent model
1. Introduction 
Environmental policy tool include: taxation, subsidy, and direct control. How should the environmental 
policy corresponding to the use of wealth and goods harmful to the environment under the circumstances 
of complete information and asymmetric information be formulated? This is the topic of discussion for 
this article. In this article the green tax reform, origin of environmental tax and the reason for imposition 
of environmental tax will be introduced in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is about the application of principle-agent 
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model under the circumstances of complete information and asymmetric information. Different tax 
treatments will be assigned to replaceable wealth and goods according to the extent of environmental 
pollution and the effectiveness of tax policy will be analyzed. In addition, the degree of recognition to 
environmental protection by society will be included in the analysis. Chapter 4 is the conclusion. 
2. Green tax reform: pollution tax  
The international trend has been leaning toward solving environmental issues with economic tools 
assisted by legal tools such as the gradual imposition of pollution tax, energy tax and ecological tax 
among European countries, the environmental charges based on Environmental Law of United States, the 
environment (pollution) tax based on the law in Japan.  
2.1 The origin of environmental tax: 
Countries all over the world have adopted direct control methods for their environmental policies 
before 1970s with direction regulations of production technology, production process, and substances 
emission standards. However, since the late 1980s environmental policies began to emphasize economic 
tools and introduce market mechanism. 
2.2 Purposes of imposition of environmental tax (Xepapadeas, 1998；Baumol, 1988) 
(1) Internalization of external cost 
The internalization of external costs by imposition of environmental tax on economic activities with 
negative external effects should force individuals or companies to reduced behaviours hazardous to 
environment based on economic incentives. As for determination of tax rate for environmental tax, 
ideally, economists would like to make it equivalent to the monetary value of damage to environment, 
which is so-called “Pigouvian Taxes” (Rosen, 2010). 
(2) Provision of incentives 
Environmental tax will provide incentives for changing consumer behaviours and reducing the 
generation of pollutants. This can reduce pollutant emission better than direct control.  
(3) Minimization of cost of pollution control 
Direct control is to ask companies to reduce pollutant emission without consideration of cost issue, 
while environmental tax will allow companies to decide whether to pay the tax or reduce pollution.  
(4) Encouraging innovation of pollution prevention technology 
The imposition of environmental tax will increase the costs of fuel, energy and pollution, such that 
companies will pursue new products and process with low pollution and the enhancement of pollution 
prevention technology for better competitiveness.  
(5) Increase of revenue and decrease of excess burden 
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The increased tax revenue is not only for fiscal revenue purpose but also for pollution prevention.
3.  The Basic Model：the application of the principle agent model (Inés, 2001) 
3.1 Basic settings: 
3.1.1. Producer: the agent 
  (1) Two kinds of plastic disposable tableware of different materials are produced by the producer. One is 
with lower production cost yet more significant damage to the environment, while the other is with 
higher product cost and less environmental pollution. These two can replace each other.  
  (2) The cost function of producer: 
        qFtqqFtqqcqc τθθθ +=++=+= ),(),(
F: fixed cost, θ : the pre-tax marginal cost, t : the marginal tax rate, τ : the after-tax marginal cost 
  (3) The production cost of producer is private information, but we know the fixed cost is F and 
1 2( , )θ θ θ∈  while assuming 2 1θ θ> , which means first kind of goods is more polluting with lower 
production cost and the second kind of goods is more environmentally friendly. The probability of 
1θ θ=  is γ  and the probability of 2θ θ=  is 1 γ− .
(4) The profit function of producer: 
        FqpqtqqcpqqCpqq −−=−−=−= τθθπ ),(),()(
3.1.2. Government: the principle 
(1) Assuming the existence of many consumers with homogeneity. 
(2) The size of the consumer is normalized to unity. 
(3) The social welfare function : ( ) ( ) ( )U q u q v q p q= − −
       Where q: consumption of plastic disposable tableware, p: price of goods 
( )u q : positive effect of goods consumption; ( ) 0u q′ > ; ( ) 0u q′′ < ; ( 0 ) 0u =
( )v q− : consumption externality, damage to the environment; ( ) 0v q′ > ; ( ) 0v q′′ > ; ( 0 ) 0v =
     (4) Environmental protection policy: the pollution tax among green taxes 
Different taxes are imposed on goods with different degrees of waste pollutions. High tax will 
be imposed on goods with higher pollution
1 0t > ; on the contrary, lower tax will be imposed on 
environmentally friendly goods 
1 2 0t t> > , or subsidy can be awarded 2 0t < . After tax, 
1 1 1 2 2 2t tτ θ θ τ= + > + =  such that the marginal production cost of pollution goods is actually 
higher than the marginal production cost of more environmentally friendly goods. 
3.2 The Optimal Contract: the complete information 
＃CASE 2-1: No externality; No tax
(1) The profit function of producer: ( ) ( , )q p q C qπ θ= − .
(2) The social welfare function: ( ) ( )U q u q p q= − .
(3) The first best: ( ) ( , )p u q C q θ θ′ ′= = = , which means marginal utility is equalled to marginal cost.  
(4) The optimal contract: ),( *1
*
1 qp , if 1θθ = ；. ),( *2*2 qp , if 2θθ =
(5) * *
1 2q q> : The quantity of goods with lower production costs (higher pollution) is larger. 
＃CASE 2-2: With externality; No tax 
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(1) The profit function of producer: ( ) ( , )q p q C qπ θ= −
(2) The social welfare function: ( ) ( ) ( )U q u q v q p q= − −
(3) The first best: ( ) ( ) ( , )p u q v q C q θ θ′ ′ ′= − = = , which means net marginal utility is equalled to 
marginal cost. 
(4) The optimal contract: ),( **1
**
1 qp , if 1θθ = ；. ),( **2**2 qp , if 2θθ =
    (5) Analysis : Since ( ) 0u q′′ <  and ( ) 0v q′′ > , we know the optimal condition is where price equals 
to net marginal effect by taking into consideration the externality of environmental pollution. From 
the eventually determined quantity * *q  smaller than *q , we know that the enhanced consumer 
awareness of environmental protection will lead to reduced consumption of goods with 
environmental pollution and reduced pollution level.  
＃CASE 2-3: With externality; With tax 
(1) Tax policy : Since the environmental pollution of the first kind of goods is more severe, the 
government decides to apply taxation and subsidy to two kinds of goods respectively in order to 
force producers to reduce production of the first kind of goods and replace it with the increased 
production of the second kind of goods. The tax rates are 
1 0t >  and 2 0t < , and the after-tax 
marginal costs appear to be 
1 2τ τ> .
    (2) The profit function of producer: ( ) ( , )q p q c q tqπ θ= − −
(3) The social welfare function: ( ) ( ) ( )U q u q v q p q= − −
(4) The first best: τθθ =+=+′=′−′= ttqcqvqup ),()()(
Which means net marginal effect is equaled to after-tax marginal cost 
(5) The optimal contract: ),( ***1
***
1 qp , if 1θθ = ；. ),( ***2***2 qp , if 2θθ =
    (6) Analysis: 
         a. Goods with higher degree of pollution: 
1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )u q v q tθ τ θ′ ′− = + = >
Since the product cost of the first kind of goods is increased after tax, we know 
*** ** *
1 1 1q q q< < , therefore the level of environmental pollution can be reduced by formulation of 
government taxation policy after responsive measures taken by both consumes and government with 
respect to environmental pollution.  
        b. More environmentally friendly goods: 
2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( )u q v q tθ τ θ′ ′− = + = <
The subsidy for the second kind of goods has led to reduced after-tax marginal cost such that 
the eventual balanced quantity *** **
2 2q q> , which means the subsidy for more environmentally 
friendly goods provides economic incentives for the production and consumption of the second kind 
of goods and the reduction of use of the first kind of goods. This way the environment can be 
improved.  
3.3 The Optimal Contract: the incomplete (asymmetry) information 
3.3.1. The expected utility : 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ]W q p u q v q p q u q v q p qγ γ= ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − −
  3.3.2. Since asymmetry information exists, thus an incentive feasible contract
1 1( , )p q  and 2 2( , )p q
must meet following conditions: 
  (1) The incentive compatibility constraint: 
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        1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
p q C q p q C q
p q C q p q C q
θ θ
θ θ
− ≥ −⎧⎨ − ≥ −⎩
  (2) The participation constraint : 0),( 1111 ≥− θqCqp ； 0),( 2222 ≥− θqCqp
＃CASE 3-1: No externality; No tax
(1) The profit function of producer: ( ) ( , )q p q C q p q F qπ θ θ= − = − −
(2) The social welfare function: ( ) ( )U q u q p q= −
    (3) The incentive compatibility constraint: 
        1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1
p q q p q q
p q q p q q
θ θ
θ θ
− ≥ −⎧⎨ − ≥ −⎩






≥ + Δ ⋅⎧⎨ ≥ − Δ ⋅⎩
；where 
2 1 0θ θ θΔ = − >
    (4) The participation constraint: 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
0
0
p q q F
p q q F
θ
θ
− − ≥⎧⎨ − − ≥⎩







    (5) The expected utility: 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
( , ) [ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ] [ (1 ) ]
W q p u q p q u q p q
u q q u q q
u q q u q q
γ γ
γ π θ γ π θ
γ θ γ θ γ π γ π
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ −
= ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − −
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ − − ⋅ + − ⋅
(6) Model:  
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
1 2 2
2
[ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ] [ (1 ) ]
. .
0
M a x u q q u q q
s t q
γ θ γ θ γ π γ π
π π θ
π
⋅ − + − ⋅ − − ⋅ + − ⋅
≥ + Δ ⋅
≥
        ⇔
1 1 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ]M a x u q q u q q qγ θ γ θ γ θ⋅ − + − ⋅ − − ⋅ Δ ⋅
. . . :F O C⇒
1( ) :q∂ 1 1[ ( ) ] 0u qγ θ′⋅ − = 1 1( )u q θ′⇒ =
2( ) :q∂ 2 2(1 ) [ ( ) ] 0u qγ θ γ θ′− ⋅ − − ⋅ Δ = 2 2( ) 0(1 )u q
γθ θγ′⇒ − = ⋅ Δ >−
(7) The optimal contract: ),( *1
*
1 SBSB qp , if 1θθ = ； ),( *2*2 SBSB qp , if 2θθ =
(8) Analysis : In terms of the quantity of the first kind of goods which cause more severe damage to the 
environment, the determination of production level is identical with the level under complete 
information without any distortion: * *
1 1S Bq q= . However, under asymmetric information, the 
production level of the second kind of goods is lower than the optimal *
2q .
In terms of environmental analysis, the expected social effectiveness of social consumption *
2q
for government will be increased, but the consumption *
1q  must take care of information rent such 
that the trade-off between them has led to uncertain net effectiveness, which is described below:  
1 1 1 2 2 2 2
* * * *






[ ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ]
( ( ) ) [ (1 ) ( ( ) ) ]
[ (1 ) ( ( ) ) ]
(1 ) ( ( ) ) 0
W u q q u q q q
d W u q d q u q d q




γ θ γ θ γ θ
γ θ γ θ γ θ
γ θ γ θ
γ θ γ θ >
<
= ⋅ − + − ⋅ − − ⋅ Δ ⋅
′ ′= ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ − − ⋅ Δ
′= − ⋅ − − ⋅ Δ
′= − ⋅ − − ⋅ Δ =
＃CASE 3-2: With externality; No tax
(1) The profit function of producer: ( ) ( , )q p q C q p q F qπ θ θ= − = − −
(2) The social welfare function: ( ) ( ) ( )U q u q v q p q= − −
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    (3) The incentive compatibility constraint: 






≥ + Δ ⋅⎧⎨ ≥ − Δ ⋅⎩
; where 
2 1 0θ θ θΔ = − >
    (4) The participation constraint: 01 ≥π ； 02 ≥π
    (5) The expected utility: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
[ ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ] [ (1 ) ]
W q p u q v q p q u q v q p q
u q v q q u q v q q
γ γ
γ θ γ θ γ π γ π
= ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − −
= ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − − − ⋅ + − ⋅
(6) Model: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
1 2 2
2
[ ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ] [ (1 ) ]
. .
0
M a x u q v q q u q v q q
s t q
γ θ γ θ γ π γ π
π π θ
π
⋅ − − + − ⋅ − − − ⋅ + − ⋅
≥ + Δ ⋅
≥
⇔
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ]M a x u q v q q u q v q q qγ θ γ θ γ θ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − − − ⋅ Δ ⋅
. . . :F O C⇒
1( ) :q∂ 1 1 1[ ( ) ( ) ] 0u q v qγ θ′ ′⋅ − − = 1 1 1( ) ( )u q v q θ′ ′⇒ − =
2( ) :q∂ 2 2 2(1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ] 0u q v qγ θ γ θ′ ′− ⋅ − − − ⋅ Δ =
2 2 2( ) ( ) 0(1 )
u q v q
γθ θγ′ ′⇒ − − = ⋅ Δ >−
(7) The optimal contract :  ),( **1
**
1 SBSB qp , if 1θθ = ； ),( **2**2 SBSB qp , if 2θθ = .
(8) Analysis :  
As in previous analysis, if the society has taken into consideration of impact of consumption on 
the environment, the eventually determined quantity **
S Bq  will be smaller than 
*q  leading to reduced 
pollution level. In addition, if * *
2 0S Bq > , then the eventual social net effectiveness will be uncertain.  




[ ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
(1 ) ( ( ) ( ) ) 0
W u q v q q u q v q q q
d W
u q v q
d q
γ θ γ θ γ θ
γ θ γ θ >
<
= ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − − − ⋅ Δ ⋅
′ ′= − ⋅ − − − ⋅ Δ =
＃CASE 3-3: With externality; With tax
(1) The profit function of producer: ( ) ( , )q p q c q tqπ θ= − −
(2) The social welfare function: ( ) ( ) ( )U q u q v q p q= − −
    (3) The incentive compatibility constraint: 
       1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
p q t q p q t q
p q t q p q t q
θ θ
θ θ
− + ≥ − +⎧⎨ − + ≥ − +⎩








≥ + Δ − Δ ⋅⎧⎨ ≥ − Δ − Δ ⋅⎩
Where 
2 1 0θ θ θΔ = − > ; 1 2 0t t tΔ = − >
    (4) The participation constraint: 01 ≥π ； 02 ≥π
    (5) The expected utility: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
( , ) [ ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ (1 ) ]
W q p u q v q p q u q v q p q
u q v q t q u q v q t q
γ γ
γ θ γ θ γ π γ π
= ⋅ − − + − ⋅ − −
= ⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − − + − ⋅ + − ⋅
(6) Model: 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
1 2 2
2
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ (1 ) ]
. . ( )
0
M ax u q v q t q u q v q t q
s t t q
γ θ γ θ γ π γ π
π π θ
π
⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − − + − ⋅ + − ⋅
≥ + Δ − Δ ⋅
≥
re-written as:
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] (1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] ( )Max u q v q t q u q v q t q t qγ θ γ θ γ θ⋅ − − + + − ⋅ − − + − ⋅ Δ − Δ ⋅
. . . :F O C⇒
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1( ) :q∂ 1 1 1 1[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ] 0u q v q tγ θ′ ′⋅ − − + = 1 1 1 1( ) ( )u q v q tθ′ ′⇒ − = +
     
2( ) :q∂ 2 2 2 2(1 ) [ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) 0u q v q t tγ θ γ θ′ ′− ⋅ − − + − ⋅ Δ − Δ =
2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )(1 )
u q v q t t
γθ θγ′ ′⇒ − − − = ⋅ Δ − Δ−
(7) The optimal contract: ),( ***1
***
1 SBSB qp , if 1θθ = ； ),( ***2***2 SBSB qp , if 2θθ = .
(8) Analysis: 
a. Goods with higher degree of pollution: *** ** *
1 1 1S B S B S Bq q q< < 1 1 1 1( ) ( )u q v q tθ′ ′⇒ − = +
Production is at efficiency point. The imposition of tax on goods with pollutions will be able to 
reduce consumption of such goods and pollution to the environment. 
    b. Environmentally friendly goods: * * *
2 S Bq .
     121122 )()( ττθθθ −=+−+=Δ−Δ ttt
 (a) 
2 1 0tθ τ τΔ − Δ = − = 2 2 2 2( ) ( )u q v q tθ′ ′⇒ − = +
The imposition of heavy tax on the first kind of goods and the subsidy for the second kind of 
goods will equalize the after-tax marginal costs of both goods, enhance the production efficiency of 
goods with environmental protection feature, and improve the social welfare level.  
 (b) 
2 1 0tθ τ τΔ − Δ = − > 2 2 2 2( ) ( )u q v q tθ′ ′⇒ − > +
        Through the design of tax policy, the quantity of the second kind of goods will be brought close to 
the optimal level leading to generation of social welfare. 
(c)
2 1 0tθ τ τΔ − Δ = − < 2 2 2 2( ) ( )u q v q tθ′ ′⇒ − < +
The subsidy for the second kind of goods is equivalent to encouraging consuming such goods. 
However, if the implementation of policy leads to higher after-tax marginal cost of the first kind of 
goods than the second kind of goods, the consumption of the second kind of goods will exceed the 
optimal social level and cause losses to social welfare. Therefore, the subsidy level should not be too 
high. The optimal subsidy (taxation) level is 
2 1t t θ= − Δ .
4.  Conclusion  
The main conclusions are: 1) Higher social emphasis on environmental pollution will lead to reduced 
consumption level of pollution goods. 2) With the implementation of tax policy, the government is able to 
reduce the quantity of pollution goods, increase the consumption level of more environmentally friendly 
goods, bring the society closer to optimal level, and enhance social welfare level. 3) The optimal rate of 
the subsidy (taxation) for the more environmentally friendly goods is 
2 1t t θ= − Δ .
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